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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-POWER OF STATES TO 
R.EcuLATE AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE-Defendant 
village, located one mile from Idlewild Airport, passed an ordinance 
prohibiting air flight over the town at less than 1,000 feet. Plaintiffs 
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, with Civil Aero-
nautics Board intervening as· plaintiff. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938 gives the CAB the authority to regulate aircraft in navigable air 
space, and the authority to define navigable airspace by setting minimum 
altitudes for flight.1 The CAB minimum altitude rules provide that 
aircraft flying over congested areas shall not be operated below 1,000 
feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 
feet, except when it is necessary to take off or land.2 The CAB has issued 
landing regulations which occasionally require aircraft to fly over the 
village of Cedarliurst at •altitudes as low as 450 feet. Held, any airspace 
defined by the CAB as necessary for the takeoff or landing of aircraft is 
navigable airspace subject to federal regulation. By adopting a compre-
hensive system of regulation within this airspace the federal government has 
152 Stat. L. 1028 (1938), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §180. 
214 C.F.R. 60.17 (1952). 
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pre-empted the field, thus superseding conflicting local regulations. 
Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, (D.C. N. Y. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 
871. 
A large •issue in the field of aeronautical law has been the division of 
regulatory power between the federal government and the states.3 One of 
the primary problems is the ex.tent of a state's power to promulgate mini-
mum altitude regulations for the protection of its citizens and property.4 
The supremacy of federal power over interstate commerce has not been 
seriously questioned of late,5 and federal control may ex.tend into the realm 
of intrastate commerce whenever an effect upon interstate commerce can be 
shown.6 Support for the extensive scope of federal regulations around 
airports is furnished by analogy to the Federal Safety Appliance Acts,7 
which apply to all traffic on any railway which is deemed a highway of 
interstate commerce.8 Considering the large number of interstate air 
carriers that operate around most airports, it is not hard to consider this 
airspace an interstate highway.9 It is clear that state regulations which 
conflict with valid federal regulations are ineffective.10 However, early 
cases indicated that state laws conflicting with CAB takeoff and landing 
regulations might not be rendered invalid.11 The rationale of these 
3 The courts have been willing to recognize that states have an extensive interest in 
the regulation of aircraft. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 
385 (1930); Parker v. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. (2d) 668, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935), cert. den. 298 
U.S. 644, 56 S.Ct. 958 (1936); Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. (2d) 201 (1944). 
4 States are not precluded from regulating the economic operations ,of airlines, or 
from taxing interstate aircraft doing business within a state. People v. Western Airlines, 
42 Cal. (2d) 621, 268 P. (2d) 723 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 859, 75 S.Ct. 87 (1954); North-
west Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 64 S.Ct. 950 (1944). But states cannot set up 
safety regulations for aircraft. Rosenaban v. United States, (10th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 
932, cert. den. 318 U.S. 790, 63 S.Ct. 993 (1943). 
Ii The federal power to regulate aircraft rests upon the commerce power, rather 
than on national ownership of the airspace. Braniff Airways v. Neb. Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 74 S.Ct. 757 (1954). 
6 Railroad Commission v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232 (1922); 
New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 42 S.Ct. 239 (1922). 
7 27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§1-7; 32 Stat. L. 943 (1903), 45 U.S.C. (1952) 
§§8-10; 36 Stat. L. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§11-16. 
8 Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2 (1911). 
9 It is doubtful if this analogy can be applied to airspace outside of the major inter-
state air lanes. See Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., (D.C. Ohio 1929) 35 
F. (2d) 761 at 763. Contra, United States v. Drumm, (D.C. Nev. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 151. 
10 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I (1824). Some Supreme Court decisions 
indicate that even consistent legislation will be invalid after Congress has occupied the 
field. Charleston & W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 35 S.Ct. 715 (1915). 
But the Court has also said that Congress must expressly exclude all state action in order 
to make consistent state legislation ineffective. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 
841 (1949). The danger that state rules could not be made to conform speedily to chang-
ing CAB rulings indicates that even consistent rules might be invalid. See Black, "Uni-
formity in Air Safety Regulation: Cooperative :Federalism Applied," 15 J. Am L. & C. 
181 (1948). 
11 Cf. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929; Smith v. 
New England Aircraft Co., note l supra; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 
1062 (1946). 
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decisions was that the federal board had not declared the airspace nec-
essary for takeoffs and landings to be navigable airspace, since they 
had set the minimum safe altitude of flight as being 1,000 feet in 
congested areas. Following this view, state courts enjoined takeoff and 
landing operations when it appeared that these flights were frequent 
enough to interfere with the landowner's use of his property.12 The ruling 
in the principal case probably marks an end to state power to enjoin such 
operations, when the operations 'themselves conform to CAB regulations. 
This result is justified by the confusion and danger to interstate commerce 
that would result from conflicting state and federal rules for takeoffs and 
landings. Further support for the court's decision can be found in Supreme 
Court decisions which indicate that the need for uniform regulations in 
.any field will limit the area of state power.13 Unfortunately, this decision 
reduces the power of the states to protect the interests of landowners 
from continuous invasion by low flying aircraft.14 A fair solution to this 
problem would require the CAB to acquire by condemnation any land the 
utility of which is destroyed by repeated flights of aircraft using takeoff 
and landing patterns approved by CAB regulations.15 
Robert W. Steele 
12 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. (2d) 245 (1942); Burnham v. Beverly 
Airways, 311 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. (2d) 87 (1942). 
13 An intent to exclude state regulation has been found in various fields. E.g.: South-
ern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 439, 35 S.Ct. 304 (1915) (railroads); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 49 S.Ct. 108 (1929) (bankruptcy); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941) (aliens); Commonwealth v. Nelson, (U.S. 
1956) 76 S.Ct. 477 (anti-subversive legislation). But states can regulate the weight and 
size of interstate carriers using state roads, possibly because this is in the field of tradi-
tional state police power. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 
U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510 (1938). Other decisions hold that when a comprehensive program 
of regulation is set down in some phases of the subject matter, the field is closed to state 
regulation while later cases indicate that congressional action raises a presumption that 
Congress has extended its power as far as possible. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 272 
U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207 (1926); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 
491 (1942). 
14 The decision in the principal case probably will not affect the power of the states 
to enjoin flights below the airspace designated by the CAB as necessary for takeoffs and 
landings. See Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491 (1955). 
15 However, the Supreme Court has said that a landowner cannot demand compen-
sation from the government for the injury to the land caused by planes operating in 
navigable airspace and following government directions. United States v. Causby, note 
11 supra. 
